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Abstract: This paper aims to study the decision-making criteria that weight on the Portuguese 
Venture Capital firm’s investment decision, as well as to create a framework which may enable 
the comparison between different projects as what regards their potential given eighteen 
selected criteria. The framework’s development was supported by previous literature and the 
collection of primary data, gathered throughut interviews and inquiries conducted with twelve 
players of the Portuguese Venture Capital industry. In line with the findings of Hisrich and 
Jankowicz (1990), Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) and Kaplan, Sensoy and Strömberg (2009), 
this paper confirms the dominant importance for the Portuguese Venture Capital firms of the 
criteria Management Team and Product and Market Opportunity over the remaining selected 
criteria, when faced with an investment decision. 
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I. Introduction 
Venture Capital is a form of corporate financing aimed mostly to early-staged businesses, 
startups or small companies, which allows to suppress the current needs of capital these firms 
have and provide incentives, as well as supporting means, to innovation and entrepreneurship 
enabling these businesses to scale. The investment is pointed at projects which are either at a 
starting or expansion phase and which are believed to have long-term growth potential. 
According to Zider (1988), the interactions of the industry are as follows. 
Venture Capitalists (General Partners) receive money from Private Investors (Limited Partners) 
to invest in Entrepreneurs’ ideas which benefit either consumers, corporations or Government 
entities. With the support of the investors, Entrepreneurs are able to scale and generate returns 
through IPOs or strategic sales in most common cases.   
 
Figure 1- How the Venture Capital industry works – Zider (1988) 
In the 1990’s the Dot.Com era was being fomented by Venture Capital, as new firms were 
emerging, internet was revolutionizing, and financing was keeping up until the bubble 
eventually burst (2001-2002) causing heavy losses. History has shown that there is a large 
sensitivity of Venture Capital activity to economic cycles, as major recession events are highly 
correlated with peaks in investment write-offs1. 
                                                          
1 Investment Write-offs refer to reductions in the value of the investment. 
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Venture Capital activity has gained more relevance in recent years. Globally, in 2017, the 
aggregated value of deals made totaled $182 bn as Figure 2 illustrates, and the compounded 
annual growth rate of the number of deals made between 2007 and 2017 was 15%. This 
popularity could be related with the stories of success that the world has come to know, as for 
example Instagram2, or Revolut, one of the 306 unicorn3 companies in 2018 (CB Insights, 
2018). 
 
Figure 2 – Global Venture Capital Deals in Number and Value - 2018 Preqin Global Private Equity & 
Venture Capital Report 
For any Venture Capital firm, returns are concentrated in very few deals, such that “(…) the 
actual distribution of returns in such ventures has a low median value but very high variance” 
(Scherer and Harhoff, 2000; Hall and Woodward 2010). Accordingly, historical performance 
of Venture Capital shows that, in general, the main source of revenue of a Venture Capital firm 
comes from few top deals, and the others either pay the upfront investment or result in a sunk 
cost. This implies that there is a huge pressure to be able to access those high potential deals 
and additionally to recognize its potential when analyzing the innumerous proposals that come 
in.  
                                                          
2 Instagram raised a Series B round of funding in 2012 with a post-money valuation of $500 million, subscribed 
by Sequoia Capital, Baseline Ventures, Benchmark and Greylock Partners. On that same year, Instagram was sold 
to Facebook by $1 billion – the valuation doubled (Crunchbase, 2018).  
3 Unicorn is the common name given to a private company which has reached a valuation over $1 billion.  
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When a firm is at an early stage, its operational performance may be inconclusive relative to 
the future performance, therefore success is uncertain. In the most common cases there hasn’t 
been enough experimentation such that a natural selection of successful business through 
market competition can take place. When the opportunity to act in the market is dependent on 
the decision of a Venture Capitalist as the best idea to invest in, the determinants of success 
will not arise from the market, but they will be subjective (Kerr, Nanda and Rhodes, 2014), 
which is an evidence on how important the decisions of Venture Capitalists are such that the 
projects which receive funding, hence are given the opportunity to operate in the market, should 
be the ones which will bring more efficiency to the Sector they are inserted in. 
Moreover, Venture Capital investment is inherently related with a principal-agent problem, i.e. 
the extent to which the interests of the agent, entrepreneur, are not aligned with those of the 
principal, Venture Capital firm, resulting in a conflict of interest. The information asymmetry 
existent between the principal and the agent poses more weight on this problem – the Venture 
Capitalist may be dealing with a dishonest entrepreneur who is in position to reveal only the 
desirable information on his project, or one who pursues short-term interests. In any case, as 
Sahlman (1996) puts it “without conflict, there is no interest”, thus this only augments the 
responsibility of the Venture Capital firm in conducting a deeper analysis prior to an 
investment, and on a post-investment phase, in fostering an environment that enhances 
cooperation.  
So, how do Venture Capital firms analyze potential investments? How do they screen and 
how do they choose? Motivated by the factors previously described, namely the implications 
of a Venture Capitalist’s decision on the ecosystem and how the success of a Venture Capital 
firm depends on choices made upon scarce information, this study was conducted on an attempt 
to answer the research question “How to compare, analyze and decide on potential 
investments?”.  
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To do so, this study will firstly understand how the industry has evolved and what can be learned 
from it, secondly look at what is currently done in the Portuguese industry using it as proof-of-
concept and, finally, create a comparative framework, the Decision Tool, which can be used to 
score potential investments based on simple criteria. The Decision Tool was then applied to a 
set of portfolio companies of BiG Start Ventures4 and one potential investment. 
II. Literature Review 
The activity of Venture Capital has been increasing as the industry grows and becomes more 
popular (Figure 2). Consequently, one can observe a rising interest of Literature on the subject, 
which has been focusing predominantly on the value of Venture Capital for society and for its 
portfolio companies (Kotrum and Lerner, 2000; Fitza, Matusik and Mosakowski, 2009; 
Anghel-Enescu, 2013; Burżacka and Gąsiorowska, 2016; among others), as well as the criteria 
and processes that support a Venture Capitalist’s investment decision which is where this study 
is inserted. 
According to the research conducted, the first contribution to Literature on Venture Capitalists’ 
decision-making process dates back to 1974, written by Wells, which studies a sample of 
Venture Capitalists in Pittsburg. Followingly, several researches were conducted, mainly 
resorting to the same methodology. 
Hisrich and Jankowicz (1990) try to study the intuition behind a Venture Capitalist’s decisions, 
and the phycological nature behind it. Recurring to a “repertory grid” technique, Hisrich and 
Jankowicz were able to identify that drivers of Venture Capitalists’ decisions were divided into 
three main areas: management, unique opportunity and appropriate returns.  
In 1994, Fried and Hisrich published “Towards a Global Model of Venture Capital Investment 
Decision Making”. Supported by eighteen Venture Capital firms which provided data and 
                                                          
4 BiG Start Ventures is the company where the internship which originated this study took place. 
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insights on both the process and the generic criteria of their investment decisions. Regarding 
the generic criteria, Fried and Hisrich deepen the three areas found by Hisrich and Jankowicz 
(1990), explaining them in more detail: (i) they define the management area as a composite of 
personal integrity, experience from prior jobs, ability to identify risk, level of commitment, 
flexibility, understanding of the business, and leadership and management skills; as for (ii) 
unique opportunity, they indicate the potential for earnings’ growth, the idea of the product 
itself, the competitive advantages, and capital requirements; and for (iii) appropriate return, 
they refer the exit prospects and potential for high return. Additionally, a model of decision-
making is created, describing six main moments that precede the decision to invest, process 
which consumes on average 97.1 days.  
Through the study of the investment analysis, legal contracts and business plans produced by 
ten US Venture Capital firms for fourty-two investments, Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) 
attempted to study the process of screening and investment choice of Venture Capitalists. 
According to their analysis, the most important characteristics to these investors are the 
opportunity - market size, strategy, technology, customer adoption and competition - the 
management team and the deal terms. They conclude that 64% of Venture Capitalists 
consider the management team as the main reason to invest, while only 26% of them consider 
favorable performance to date to be decisive. Low valuation or favorable contractual structure 
is also considered attractive. The study describes that although Venture Capitalists invest in 
opportunities they see as attractive, they understand the risks associated and adjust the 
contractual structures accordingly, through performance sensitive compensation and control 
rights. Additionally, the authors are able to map expectations of Venture Capitalists towards 
market size and growth, as they identify that the median size of the market for the sample of 
portfolio companies gathered is $6.5 billion (the average $25.1 billion) and the median portfolio 
firm is expected to grow from sales of $0.2M and EBIT of -$0.2M to sales of $63M and EBIT 
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of $6M in only four years. They also conclude that ventures with strong management teams are 
almost three times more likely to exit through an IPO than the remaining, besides obtaining 
more attractive contracts and yielding superior performance on average which suggests that 
management teams’ appraisal is crucial. 
Kaplan, Sensoy and Strömberg (2009) address in their study the long-lasting debate considering 
the relative importance for Venture Capitalists of the quality of the management team (the 
jockey) and business idea (the horse) when deciding to invest. Through the study of the life-
cycle of 50 Venture Capital-financed companies, the research concludes that although revenues 
and market value tends to increase dramatically through time, the scope of the business remains 
roughly the same. Additionally, as firms evolve the relevance of the expertise of the 
management tends to decrease and the turnover is substantial. The conclusion to which Kaplan, 
Sensoy and Strömberg reach is that Venture Capital investors should give greater importance 
to the business due diligence rather than the management one, because the management is more 
likely to change. However, the interviews conducted and analysis of other contributions to 
Literature disagree, pointing at the management team as the most important characteristic.  
In 2009, Chemmanur et. al. use the Longitudinal Research Database of the U.S. Census Bureau 
to study the efficiency gains that a Venture Capital firm can generate in its investments, 
concluding that overall the efficiency is higher in Venture Capital-backed firms. In their study, 
they discover that 21% of efficiency increases in Venture Capital-backed companies are related 
with screening effects and 35% with monitoring. Their research also indicates that Venture 
Capitalists can be rather similar when selecting their investments, but the value that each is able 
to generate through monitoring activities is quite discrepant. 
Rajan (2010) tries to understand if the superior performance of Venture Capital portfolio 
companies is driven by the characteristics prior to the investment or by the contribution of the 
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Venture Capital firm. To do so, Rajan also investigates the drivers and process of an investment 
in the industry. According to his research Venture Capital funds commonly have focuses, in 
sector or stage of financing, which contribute to an initial segmentation of potential deals and 
these are often related to the experience of the Venture Capital team, since apart from providing 
capital they also try to contribute with their own expertise in the industry or networks, to 
improve business models and access to market. Rajan concludes that the performance of a 
Venture Capital portfolio company is boosted by both the selection and value addition effects. 
Considering the Literature analyzed, it was found that the most common molds in which 
researchers study the decision-processes of Venture Capital firms is to conduct surveys and/or 
interviews with focus groups, gathering information on the analysis performed previously to an 
investment, its monitoring and exit details on a framework. There has been great interest in 
studying the screening and selection process of Venture Capitalists in terms of the 
characteristics which are of higher importance or which better predict the success of an 
investment. However, to dive further and develop a framework that can assist Venture 
Capitalists and entrepreneurs to better assess quantitatively Early-staged businesses, even if 
only in relative terms, has also been a frequent approach.  
The managing director of the Phoenix office of Cayenne Consulting, Akira Hirai created the 
Valuation Calculation tool which allows high-tech, seed and early stage firms to estimate the 
pre-money valuation by answering twenty-five questions [Annex 1]. Although the resulting 
valuations are intended to support entrepreneurs while assessing their business, the intuition 
behind the questions relates to relevant criteria for Venture Capital investors. 
Also, Villalobos, Payne and Lipper (2007), present a Valuation Worksheet [Annex 2] with a 
discrimination of the factors that affect the value of a company and respective impact. As 
described in the article, “no two investors will value a company the same”, however, as a 
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guidance tool the Worksheet is of great relevance to Venture Capitalists, as well as to 
entrepreneurs. 
III. The Portuguese Venture Capital Industry 
In Portugal, by definition, there is not a clear distinction between what is Venture Capital and 
how it is different from Private Equity as there is in the US, both concepts are incorporated 
under the term “Capital de Risco” (hereinafter referred as “Risk Capital”). According to 
Anghel-Enescu (2013), the US term Venture Capital is referred to seed, startup and expansion 
investments whereas Private Equity is referred to Buy-outs, but in Europe the concept Private 
Equity encompasses Venture Capital, hence seed, startup and expansion investments, as well 
as Buy-outs. 
The activity of any Risk Capital is regulated by CMVM (Comissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários) where firms that want to perform Venture Capital and/or Private Equity activities 
have to be registered in, as well as the funds managed. There are currently 46 registered entities 
with 110 active funds registered at CMVM [Annex 3]. 
However, players in the industry such as the ones of the sample studied, recognize that even 
though these numbers may be accurate in terms of registry, in practical terms there are 
considerably fewer active entities. With effect, according to data from Invest Europe5 there are 
currently twenty-five Private Equity firms operating and headquartered in Portugal, of which 
only eleven are Venture Capital firms [Annex 4] – this source is more likely to capture the 
current activity of the market.  
After the 2008 financial crisis and respective repercussions in the industry, Private Equity and 
Venture Capital activity in Europe has been recovering, with a 2.2% compounded annual 
                                                          
5 Invest Europe is the association representing Europe’s private equity, venture capital and infrastructure sectors, 
as well as their investors, formerly known as European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA). 
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growth rate from 2008 until 2017. Analyzing Figure 3, one can depict that the level of activity 
in 2017 has surpassed 2008’s records. 
 
Figure 3 – Overview Fundraising, Investment & Divestment with data on more than 1,250 European Private Equity firms, 
the 2017 statistics cover 89% of the €640 bn capital under management in Europe – Invest Europe (2017) 
As Figure 3 evidences, there has been rise of the amount of funds raised by European private 
equity firms from 2015 until 2017. This is a reliable indicator that these companies have been 
successful throughout its operations such that investors (Limited Partners) continue to allocate 
funds to Private Equity firms. 
IV. Methodology 
As previously discussed, this Work Project entails two main goals. On the one side, it aims to 
understand the criteria which better determine the future success of potential investments at an 
initial appraisal of the company. On the other side, it aims to build a framework which can 
attribute a quantitative, even though relative and inevitably subjective, scoring to any potential 
investment which being analyzed by an investor.  
With that in sight, the study was built such that, firstly, with a critical judgement and the help 
of BiG Start Ventures, it was withdrawn from past studies the criteria that could be simple and 
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observable on the first interactions that a Venture Capital firm has with a potential investment. 
This selection is further explored in chapter VI. Analysis and Results.  
Secondly, through the collection of data from a sample of Venture Capital firms which have 
been successful – and for simplicity it was assumed that the ability to raise funds characterizes 
the Venture Capital firm as successful – the framework selected, was calibrated in terms of the 
weight that each criterion has on the decision to invest considering the importance that, on 
average, the sample of Venture Capital investors give to that criterion. This allowed the 
construction of the Decision Tool, a comparative framework that comprises all the criterion 
selected and enables Venture Capital investors to reach a relative scoring of a potential 
investment from 0 to 5 (such that 0 is not invest and 5 is invest) by attributing a grade to each 
criterion considering the characteristics of the company being analyzed.  
Lastly, the Decision Tool was applied using information of a set of companies of the current 
portfolio of BiG Start Ventures as what regards their scores on each criterion at the time of the 
investment in. This was compared with the score resultant of a second application of the tool to 
a potential investment pointed out by BiG Start Ventures. The conclusions are described on 
chapter VI. Analysis and Results.   
V. Data 
The data gathered was collected, as previously mentioned, through interviews and inquiries 
conducted with a sample of players the Portuguese Venture Capital Industry.  
There were in total twelve answers analyzed, categorized in Figure 4 according to respective 
claims of business activity.  
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Figure 4 – Type of investors – Own 
As illustrated in Figure 5, one can recognize that despite few variations, this sample of Venture 
Capital firms is more focused on early-stage B2B solutions. 
  
Figure 5 – Stage and Strategy of focus – Own 
Additionally, Figure 6 suggests that the ticket size is predominantly small (between 0 – 250 €K 
for almost 50% of the firms). 
Average Ticket Size 
 
Figure 6 – Average Ticket Size in € thousands – Own 
On average, these firms manage 2 funds, comprising 14 companies in portfolio, and have 
performed 4 exits in the market since inception.  
The characterization of the sample previously described is coherent with the fact that the 
Portuguese market is still small. According to data from Invest Europe relative to 2017, the 
total amount invested in Risk Capital in Portugal was 115 million euros corresponding to only 
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0.16% of the total investment in Europe (73.5 billion euros), whereas in Italy it was 2.3 billion 
euros, in Spain 2.5 billion euros and in the UK 29 billion euros. 
The average amount of projects received per year by this group of Venture Capital is 440 – 
more than one project a day, in a market which is still on the rise – moreover 100% of them 
reported that they run the analysis process internally, which substantiates the claim of 
Macmillan, Siegel and Narasimha (1985) that Venture Capital firms, which tend to be 
constituted by small teams, are overloaded with proposals to screen and analyze, an activity 
which by itself is extremely time-consuming and mostly non-profitable. This demonstrates the 
importance of the Decision Tool, as an auxiliary tool that supports investors in the prioritization 
of future analysis. 
VI. Analysis and Results 
Criteria 
The general criteria that weights on an investment decision are broadly accepted. What differs 
between investors is the relative importance that each criterion plays on the final decision 
(Hisrich and Jankowicz, 1990). That may depend on the Venture Capital firm and its 
specifications (market focus, investment strategy, among others) as well as the individuality of 
the investor, his attitude towards risk and former experience.  
After analyzing several frameworks or sets of criteria available from past researches [Annex 
5], the eighteen criteria selected to integrate in the Decision Tool fell under the following 
categories: (i) Management Team, (ii) Product and Market Opportunity, (iii) Financial Plan, 
(iv) Exit Prospects and (v) Deal Terms. The selection was made considering that the criteria 
had to be simple and easy to assess without the need of extensive knowledge about the target 
company considering the goal of the Decision Tool is to compare potential investments in a 
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pre-due diligence phase where usually information is not fully accessible and complete. The 
criteria (in bold) are below described. 
 (i) Management Team 
The Management Team is numerous times reported as the most important factor in the decision 
of investing (Macmillan, Siegel and Narasimha, 1985). A Venture Capitalist usually invests in 
a project carried through by the management team, even if he has the ability to guide these 
persons or eventually replace them, it is important for the investor to be able to rely on these 
individuals as professionals and as human beings. Within the several characteristics of the team 
which may contribute to higher probability of success, three of them stand out as easy to 
perceive. Firstly, the entrepreneurial spirit and will of the management can be measured through 
the ambition revealed, as mentioned throughout the interviews conducted,  
Secondly, as Fried and Hisrich (1994) mention, their knowledge and expertise of the industry 
necessary to a good strategy – do they understand the market? How do they relate to it? This 
influences the ability to understand the problem they are solving and to adapt their solution to 
the reality. Within this criterion, their experience is also relevant, whether in the industry, as a 
previous entrepreneur, or both. In fact, several studies conducted reveal that founders which 
have previously performed an exit and succeeded are more likely to succeed on another exit 
(Gompers et al, 2006).  
Lastly, it is important for the investor to be able to recognize the ability to execute in the 
management team, which comes from its quality and complementarity between the 
members. For example, one of the Venture Capitalists interviewed claimed that, from his 
experience, the ideal team of founders was composed by two individuals, a sales-person and a 
tech-person such that their complementarity could drive results more efficiently. 
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 (ii) Product and Market Opportunity 
The Product and Market Opportunity is also highly mentioned in past Literature (Sahlman, 
1996; Villalobos, Payne and Lipper, 2017; among others). It is relevant that the product or 
technology is attractive in such a way that it is differentiable (Rajan, 2010), captures the 
consumer’s attention, and is not easily imitated. Venture Capital investors are also known to be 
attracted by large and growing markets (Rajan, 2010) and ideas that can be efficiently scalable 
and drive large revenues. A favorable competitive position is desirable because, as Kerr, Nanda 
and Rhodes (2014) explore, when the product goes to market it is likely to go through a 
Darwinian experimentation where the market will choose the best provider causing only 
differentiated and competitive players to survive. This is linked with the likelihood of customer 
adoption, which is an indicator of the revenues’ potential (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2000).  
Another criterion that is more subjective in terms of determining the future success but was 
found to be very important to Venture Capital investors through the interviews conducted, is 
the positive intuition that the investor develops towards the company, the product and its 
purpose. If the investor believes in the idea, he is confident that others will as well. Additionally, 
as discussed by Macmillan, Siegel and Narasimha (1985), it is relevant that the company’s 
product comes to either stimulate an existing market or create a new one, hence, that it is to fill 
in a “gap” to the extent that the product it brings results with a relevant solution to an unmet 
need. 
(iii) Strategy and Plans 
The strategy and plans indicated by the company are indicative of the path that the company 
will take, hence the way these plans are structured indicates what the first steps of the company 
will be. 
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The Financial plan plays an important role (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2000), not restrictive to 
the numbers given per se, or the performance to date, but also enabling to recognize the ability 
that the management team has of projecting their idea to the future, which is a good indicator 
of a defined path and objective milestones. Hence, it is important that the financial plan reflects 
a knowledge of the applicable and commonly used metrics in the industry and a realistic view 
on the potential performance of the product. On the other hand, the Marketing plan allows the 
investor to understand how the product will be promoted and how it will attract new customers, 
which is an important concern for Venture Capitalists (Sahlman, 1996). As indicated by the 
Venture Capitalists studied, the roadmap defined is also decisive in measuring the strategy of 
the company as it defines the go-to-market strategy and the developments, either operational 
or technical, that the team expects in a given period of time. 
The favorable performance to date (Macmillan, Siegel and Narasimha, 1985) and traction 
will also play an important role in terms of analyzing how is the product working, how it is 
being accepted and how the market demand is quantitatively evident. 
(iv) Exit Prospects 
Exit prospects are an important factor to consider as the potential for a high return can only 
come from exit prospects (Fried and Hisrich, 1994). At an early stage, the investor can 
investigate, for example, if the idea is inserted in a hot place for M&A or if there is a potential 
strategic buyer. 
(v) Deal Terms 
The Deal Terms may not be completely disclosed at first; however, these are also very important 
(Sahlman, 1996). For the purpose of the Decision Tool, this category will be measured through 
two criteria.  Firstly, through syndication potential, which can be objectively quantified if other 
VCs have invested or are interested in investing. Secondly, through the amount of funding 
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required (Villalobos, Payne and Lipper, 2007) which can also be objectively quantified in a low 
valuation. 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 exhibit the average importance that the sample of Venture Capital 
investors studied attributes to each criterion and category. 
Average Weight of Categories 
 
Figure 7 – Average weight attributed to each category as a result of the inquiries made – own 
Average Weight of Criteria 
 
Figure 8 – Average weight attributed to each criterion as a result of the inquiries made – own 
Decision Tool 
The Decision Tool has the final purpose of attributing a comparative score to a potential 
investment given a set of eighteen criteria and the importance that those criteria weight 
considering the practices of the sample of Venture Capitalists studied. Hence, one could define 
that final scoring as a function of the eighteen criteria grouped into the five categories 
previously defined. The following equation illustrates the function: 
Management Team 5.00
Market and Product Opportunity 4.64
Exit Prospects 3.82
Deal Terms 3.36
Strategy and Plans 2.39
Ambition of Management 4.45
Management expertise in the industry 4.18
Quality, ability to execute and Complementarity 4.58
Large Market size and growth 4.82
Attractive product and/or technology 4.55
Highly likelihood of customer adoption 4.09
Favorable competitive position 3.82
Use of recent technologies 3.00
Positive intuition towards the company 3.00
Relevant solution for an unmet need 2.50
Other VCs have invested 2.73
Low valuation 2.45
Financial Plan 1.00
Favorable performance to date 3.91
Marketing Plan 2.45
Traction 2.08
Go-to-market strategy and roadmap 2.50
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𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  𝛽1 𝑀𝑇 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑃𝑂 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑃 +  𝛽4𝐷𝑇 +  𝛽5𝐸𝑃                    (1) 
Where MT refers to Management Team, MPO to Market and Product Opportunity, SP to 
Strategy and Plans, DT to Deal Terms and EP to Exit Prospects; and the betas are calculated 
as: 
𝛽𝑖 =  𝑊𝑖 ∗  𝑆𝑖                                                        (2) 
Where Wi is the weight of category i and Si is the score of category i, which in turn is calculated 
as the weighted average score of the criteria that compose it. 
The Decision Tool was built so that each criterion can be scored from 0 to 5 (grey area in Figure 
9) considering the specifications of the potential investment in analysis. The final score of each 
potential investment will also be a value in the same scale (0 to 5). The Decision Tool will 
weigh the attributed scorings to the criteria with the weights of i) (each criterion on the 
category), and ii) (each category on the final score). 
Decision Tool 
 
Figure 9 – Decision Tool – own  
Application to Real Data 
The final score that an investor reaches, alone, cannot lead to a solid conclusion since this is a 
relative tool where one needs to compare the results of a set of companies in order to be able to 
Weights 
(out of 5)
Attributed 
punctuation 
(out of 5)
Weights 
(out of 5)
Attributed 
punctuation 
(out of 5)
Management Team 26% 0,00 Exit Prospects 20% 0,00
(is it a hot space)
Ambition of Management 34% 0 100% 0
Management expertise in the industry 32% 0
Quality, ability to execute and Complementarity 35% 0 Deal Terms 18% 0,00
Other VCs have invested 53% 0 Final Scoring
Market and Product Opportunity 24% 0,00 Low valuation 47% 0 0,00
Large Market size and growth 19% 0 Strategy and Plans 12% 0,00
Attractive product and/or technology 18% 0
Highly likelihood of customer adoption 16% 0 Financial Plan 8% 0
Favorable competitive position 15% 0 Favorable performance to date 33% 0
Use of recent technologies 12% 0 Marketing Plan 21% 0
Positive intuition towards the company 12% 0 Traction 17% 0
Relevant solution for an unmet need 10% 0 Go-to-market strategy and roadmap 21% 0
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draw conclusions about the potential of each investment. Hence, in order for BiG Start Ventures 
to be able to use the Decision Tool, it first scored nine of the current investments in portfolio, 
the ones pointed out as relevant for this purpose, with data relative to the time of the investment 
decision. This allowed to define a threshold that represents the average score at which BiG Start 
Ventures has invested in the past, enabling the comparison of the final score of a potential 
investment relative to the current portfolio.  Figure 10 illustrates the results reached. 
Score of nine BiG Start Ventures Portfolio Companies 
 
Figure 10 – Score of BiG Start Ventures’ Portfolio – Own 
The threshold is at 3.92, hence BiG Start Ventures should target at investments that score above 
3.92 according to the Decision Tool. 
For the purpose of the threshold calculated, the arithmetic average was chosen as it is the 
measure of central tendency which incorporates each value in the sample equally weighted, 
hence not benefiting or harming some values to the detriment of others but reaching a value 
that represents the entirety of the sample. Nonetheless, considering the median of the scores in 
this case, 3.9, is very close to the average, 3.92, the distribution of the scores is close to a 
symmetric distribution. 
Final Score
Portfolio Company 1 4.33
Portfolio Company 2 4.29
Portfolio Company 3 4.16
Portfolio Company 4 4.09
Portfolio Company 5 3.90
Portfolio Company 6 3.76
Portfolio Company 7 3.71
Portfolio Company 8 3.65
Portfolio Company 9 3.34
Average 3.92
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It was proposed by BiG Start Ventures to evaluate one of the companies in pipeline6, hereinafter 
mentioned as Pipeline 1. An introduction to the company and the description of the application 
of the Decision Tool will be followingly presented, as well as the main conclusions drawn. 
Pipeline 1 is a Pre-Seed startup company currently managed by one person, to whom two other 
co-founders will join soon, gathering in total three skills: management, sales and tech. The 
company has met with BiG Start Ventures one time, after a flow of emails explaining the main 
idea. The following hypothesis support the scores attributed to each criterion. 
As what regards the management team, the ambition is evidenced in the plans of largely 
expanding the business. Additionally, there is relevant expertise both in the industry, where the 
founder has worked before for an incumbent institution, and in the entrepreneurial space, given 
that he has created a successful startup which was sold to a strategic player. However, there is 
no experience in the combination of both. The background and expertise of the management 
team seem to combine well although there is no relevant information on how they work 
together, and BiG has only met one of them. 
The market is considerably large, with high potential of scalability – the market value in 2017 
for Western Europe according to the Euromonitor International was approximately 14 billion 
euros. The company will start by targeting only the B2B segment of small to micro enterprises, 
and then ideally grow into medium and larger corporations and even the B2C segment.  The 
solution is relevant and evidently solves an unmet need but given that this is a hot space on the 
rise, the user-experience must be differentiating such that Pipeline 1 can place itself in a 
favorable competitive position.  
                                                          
6 Pipeline is the common designation of a set of companies with which the investor has had contact and is or will 
soon be analyzing. 
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Pipeline 1’s product would very easily be acquired by an incumbent institution hence the exit 
prospects are evident. On the other hand, the current pre-money valuation of the company is 
expensive when compared with other peers at this stage of development. 
The plans of the company are robust, although some assumptions are still to be verified pending 
on the materialization of a set of partnerships that highly impact the financial plan and go-to-
market strategy. Lastly, concerning the performance to date, it translates only to small product 
developments, with no traction yet. 
The final scoring obtain is presented in Figure 11. 
Application of the Decision Tool 
 
Figure 11 – Scoring of Pipeline 1 – Own  
The final score of Pipeline 1 is 3.77, thus is below the threshold previously defined for BiG 
Start Ventures. The low score is a reflection of the very early stage at which Pipeline 1 stands, 
considering that the product is not yet developed, and important partnerships are required for 
the business model to sustain. 
However, one must point out that the Decision Tool was calibrated with investors that focus on 
Early-Stage investment, but not necessarily Pre-Seed investments which would require a 
Weights 
(out of 5)
Attributed 
punctuation 
(out of 5)
Weights 
(out of 5)
Attributed 
punctuation 
(out of 5)
Management Team 26% 4,16 Exit Prospects 20% 5,00
(is it a hot space)
Ambition of Management 34% 4 100% 5
Management expertise in the industry 32% 4,5
Quality, ability to execute and Complementarity 35% 4 Deal Terms 18% 1,42
Other VCs have invested 53% 0 Final Scoring
Market and Product Opportunity 24% 4,43 Low valuation 47% 3 3,77
Large Market size and growth 19% 4 Strategy and Plans 12% 2,98
Attractive product and/or technology 18% 5
Highly likelihood of customer adoption 16% 5 Financial Plan 8% 4
Favorable competitive position 15% 4 Favorable performance to date 33% 3
Use of recent technologies 12% 4 Marketing Plan 21% 4
Positive intuition towards the company 12% 4 Traction 17% 0
Relevant solution for an unmet need 10% 5 Go-to-market strategy and roadmap 21% 4
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different approach, given that zero was attributed to some of the criteria which cannot be 
measured drawing the score down.  
Considering the limitation previously mentioned, and the fact that BiG Start Ventures has 
already invested at an inferior scoring, it is advisable that the fund continues to follow-on 
conversations with Pipeline 1, in order to better understand the evolution of some of the criteria 
and reevaluate at a posterior time period. 
VII. Conclusions 
This study examines the process of screening and selection in Venture Capital, depicting the 
most important characteristics a Venture Capital investor looks for when analyzing potential 
investments. This enabled to create the Decision Tool, which can be used by BiG Start Ventures 
to objectively compare potential investments among each other and/or with the portfolio 
companies. 
In accordance with the findings of Hisrich and Jankowicz (1990), Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) 
and Kaplan, Sensoy and Strömberg (2009), a unanimous and maximum importance is given to 
the Management, followed by the Market and Product Opportunity and the Exit prospects. 
In this study, it was also observed a general concordance as what regards the criteria, as well as 
a similar profile of the Venture Capital investors as what respects strategies. This reflects that 
the sample of Venture Capitalists tends to screen in a similar manner in concordance with the 
findings of Chemmanur et. al. (2009). 
The Decision Tool was applied to a set of BiG Start Ventures’ portfolio companies, which 
allowed the definition of a threshold at 3.92 such that BiG Start Ventures should ideally target 
at companies that are scored above the threshold. This is, evidently, only an indicative score 
that is subject to the limitations of the Decision Tool. 
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The application of the Decision Tool to a company in the pipeline of BiG Start Ventures, 
resulted in a score below the threshold but above the minimum score at which BiG Start 
Ventures has invested. The conclusion was, then, that a follow-up of further was required in 
order to more accurately quantify the performance of that company in terms of the chosen 
criteria. 
VIII. Limitations and Further Recommendations 
One limitation of this study concerns the methodology of inquiries. As discussed by Hudson 
and Evans (2005), inquiries can be deceiving to the extent that the inquired investor could be 
influenced by his perception of what would be an ideal answer more than his real doings or 
could even believe to act differently from what he acts in reality. This would skew the results 
obtained towards the ideal perception of the decision process. However, this limitation does not 
invalidate the results obtained, as the ideal decision process is relevant when considering the 
probability of higher success. 
One way to possibly mitigate this would be to monitor the Venture Capitalist in his daily activity 
and study his practices through a closer analysis. Furthermore, the ideal study of a successful 
screening and selection process of Venture Capital firms would be to monitor closely a wide 
number of investments from the point where the startup enters the Venture Capitalist’s radar 
until its exit. With such information, one could extrapolate the screening and selection processes 
that relate with the success of Venture Capitalists through econometric studies, understanding 
how each characteristic valued by the Venture Capitalist at the time of the investment was 
decisive for its performance and exit and eliminating possible biases along the way. However, 
to reach such information one would have to open up the scope of the study either to Europe or 
the US in order to have a considerable sample of investments that Venture Capitalists would be 
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willing to provide information on. Moreover, this methodology would imply a much longer 
time-frame.  
With regards to the Decision Tool created, one must recognize two very important limitations 
followingly described.  
Firstly, the Decision Tool cannot be determinant for an investment. As acknowledged by Kerr 
et al. (2014) “Entrepreneurship is fundamentally about experimentation because the knowledge 
required to be successful cannot be known in advance or deduced from some set of first 
principles”. In their paper they calculate the raw correlation between the scores attributed by 
the partners of a successful Venture Capital firm at the time of the investment and the return 
multiple, reaching a correlation of 0.1. Figure 12 illustrates the results. 
Correlation between scores and return multiples 
 
Figure 12 – Correlation between scores and return multiples of a successful US Venture Capital firm’s investments – Kerr et 
al. (2014) 
Because there is no one-size-fits-all, the Decision Tool can only be a tool that helps to compare 
potential investments and potentially indicate topics for further analysis which are relevant for 
investors. Nonetheless, one must consider that not all the specificities of each are taken into 
account by the Decision Tool.  
Secondly, considering the calibration of the model was made with a sample of Venture Capital 
investors, the characteristics of their strategies of investment are limitations for the analysis. 
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For example, one of the Venture Capitalists interviewed claimed that he expected less in terms 
of financial plan from an Early-stage startup than from one obtaining Series A financing, hence 
the weight of that criterion would vary according to the stage of the investment.  
Considering the threshold defined for BiG Start Ventures, one must point out that the use of the 
arithmetic average is not the most accurate approach, as it assumes that some of the investments 
made by the firm are below its target score without taking into account their performance after 
the investment. Furthermore, a more accurate method would be to look at the scores of 
successful investment decisions made by the firm, as well as scores of the decisions to not 
invest, and encompass this information into a more realistic threshold. However, without such 
information and taking a conservative more conservative position, the arithmetic average will 
be used as the threshold until there is enough information to define a more accurate one. 
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Appendix 
Annex 1 – “Startup Valuation Calculation” – Akira Hirai – Cayenne Consulting, 2001 
1. My product or service is: 
a. An idea that I've been toying for a while; 
b. Currently under development, backed by solid market research and a business 
plan; 
c. Finally, a working prototype being tested by potential customers; 
d. Now generating revenues; 
2. My industry is: 
a. Something that has to do with selling to the general public (retail, food, 
entertainment, etc.) or to the government; 
b. A field that nobody yet recognizes as being an industry, because my product is 
so cutting edge; 
c. One that was in fashion among investors a few years ago (telecommunications, 
Internet, B2Anything, etc.); 
d. One that is currently in fashion among investors (medical devices, 
nanotechnology, proteomics, security software, money-saving enterprise 
software, etc.); 
3. My product or service will: 
a. Have some novelty value (i.e., there is only minor demand for the product in the 
marketplace); 
b. Make life a bit easier or more enjoyable for many people, but not solve any 
fundamental problems (i.e., a "nice to have" but not a "must have" for most 
buyers); 
c. Help a lot of people or companies do what they do a bit better, faster, and cheaper 
(i.e., the product addresses a fairly substantial need in the marketplace); 
d. Save lots of lives and/or money (i.e., the product is urgently needed in the 
marketplace); 
4. Global annual revenues in the sub-sector of the market I am competing in is: 
a. Under $500 million; 
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b. $500 million to $1 billion; 
c. $1-5 billion; 
d. Over $5 billion; 
5. My market is: 
a. Flat or shrinking; 
b. Growing by under 10% per year; 
c. Growing by 10-30% per year; 
d. Growing by more than 30% per year; 
6. My primary competitors (others who are competing for the same consumer dollar by 
satisfying the same consumer need) are: 
a. Nonexistent, since customers are not spending money to satisfy the need that I 
think they have; 
b. Large companies with big R&D and marketing budgets and existing distribution 
channels (i.e., I'm entering a mature industry dominated by large competitors); 
c. Other startups that I may or may not know about (i.e., I'm entering a fairly new 
market being explored by other startups); 
d. Substitutes (e.g., the word processor is a substitute for the typewriter, which in 
turn is a substitute for pen and paper - in other words, what I offer is new and 
doesn't have a direct competitor yet, but customers have other ways to satisfy 
these needs); 
7. My customers (or potential customers) have: 
a. Not been identified; 
b. Expressed interest in what I am doing; 
c. Helped my team develop the product specifications and have placed pre-orders; 
d. Purchased and raved about my product, and have placed repeat orders; 
8. My sales and marketing plan is: 
a. If I build it, they will come; 
b. If I build a website, optimize my keywords, and submit it to Google, they will 
come; 
c. I will hire a bunch of salespeople on commission only to go sell my product; 
d. I have an extensive, well-researched sales and marketing plan that includes a 
mix of proven, cost-effective sales and marketing tactics; 
9. My revenues over the past 12 months were: 
a. $0-$999,999; 
b. $1,000,000 - $4,999,999; 
c. $5,000,000 or more; 
d. $10,000,000 or more; 
10. My revenues over the next 12 months are expected to be: 
a. $0-$999,999; 
b. $1,000,000 - $4,999,999; 
c. $5,000,000 - $9,999,999; 
d. $10,000,000 or more; 
11. My revenues 5 years from now are expected to be: 
a. Under $9,999,999; 
b. $10,000,000 to $29,999,999; 
c. $30,000,000 - $79,999,999; 
d. $80,000,000 or more; 
12. My strategic partnerships consist of: 
a. A few emails exchanged with this guy I met at a local networking event; 
b. A letter of intent drafted by a potential distributor for my product; 
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c. A handful of legitimate signed partnerships and more in the works; 
d. Exclusive R&D, licensing, supply, and distribution partnership agreements 
signed with a dozen Fortune 2000 companies; 
13. My intellectual property includes: 
a. All this stuff in my head; 
b. A provisional patent application I prepared and filed myself; 
c. Pending patents filed a couple of years ago; 
d. Multiple issued patents in the U.S. and other major countries in Europe and Asia, 
comprising a total of 300 claims that broadly cover the entire value chain of my 
invention, along with various trademarks and service marks to protect my brand; 
14. The highest level of entrepreneurial experience achieved by anybody on my team 
consists of: 
a. Reading Inc. and Fast Company magazines; 
b. Running a successful small business or franchise; 
c. Working as a co-founder or early employee in a successful high-tech startup; 
d. Establishing, growing, and selling or IPOing a number of companies that many 
would recognize by name; 
15. I developed my expertise in this market by excelling at senior positions in the industry 
for: 
a. Never; 
b. Under 2 years; 
c. 2-5 years; 
d. Over 5 years; 
16. The number of Ph.D.s that have been working for me full time for at least three months 
is: 
a. None; 
b. 1 to 4; 
c. 5 to 9; 
d. 10 or more; 
17. The number of sales/marketing/ business development experts who understand and have 
extensive contacts within my industry who have been working for me full time for at 
least three months is: 
a. None; 
b. 1 to 4; 
c. 5 to 9; 
d. 10 or more; 
18. My business plan: 
a. Does not exist; 
b. Suffers from quite a few of the mistakes described in "Why Business Plans Don't 
Get Funded"; 
c. Looks pretty near perfect in my eyes; 
d. Looks pretty near perfect in the eyes of the advisors, attorneys, accountants, and 
investors who have seen it; 
19. I have invested ______ hours of my own time into this venture. 
a. 0 – 999; 
b. 1,000 - 1,999; 
c. 2,000 - 3,999; 
d. 4,000 or more 
20. I have invested ______ of my own funds (from savings, credit cards, second mortgage, 
selling blood, etc.) into this venture. 
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a. $0 - $24,999; 
b. $25,000 - $99,999; 
c. $100,000 - $249,999; 
d. $250,000 or more; 
21. My corporate attorney is: 
a. My cousin Sal, who got his law degree at the local community college law 
school; 
b. A small local firm that normally specializes in personal injury suits; 
c. A small-to-medium sized local firm that works with a lot of startups; 
d. One of the nationally recognized corporate law firms with many connections in 
the venture capital community; 
22. My intellectual property attorney is: 
a. Did I tell you about my cousin Sal? 
b. A small local firm that claims to be an intellectual property generalist; 
c. A small-to-medium sized local firm that works with a lot of startups; 
d. One of the nationally recognized intellectual property law firms staffed with 
attorneys who worked in R&D in my field before going to law school; 
23. If a Fortune 500 company decided to put their resources behind competing with my 
startup tomorrow, my startup would be: 
a. Toast; 
b. Happy that the market is being validated by a major player, but would have to 
settle for a smaller market share; 
c. Able to stay a step ahead through innovation, agility, and speed; 
d. Delighted to partner with them and license our proprietary technology to them, 
since there's no way they can get in this market without infringing on our rock-
solid patents; 
24. Once my product is on the market, my marginal gross margins - a new dollar of revenue 
minus the cost of producing that revenue - will: 
a. Huh? 
b. Essentially be flat, like a service business; 
c. Increase gradually, like a hardware business; 
d. Increase rapidly, like a software business; 
25. Other startups in my industry raising venture capital at a similar stage of development 
(product, management team, revenues, partnerships, prior funding, etc.) are getting pre-
money valuations of: 
a. Under $1 million; 
b. $1-2 million; 
c. $2-5 million; 
d. Over $5 million; 
 
 
Annex 2 – “Valuation Worksheet” – Luís Villalobos – Villalobos, Payne and Lipper, 2007 
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Area Impact Characteristic
+ Many years of experience
++ Experience in the business sector
+++ Experience as a CEO
++ Experience as a COO, CTO, CFO
+ Experience as a product manager
- Experience only as a sales person or technologist
-- Straight out of school
deal killer unwilling
- difficult to convinve
0 neutral
+ willing
++ key part of the plan
0 Yes
deal killer No
-- Very incomplete (none identified)
- Somewhat incomplete
0 Good start
+ Rather complete team
++ A complete and experienced management team
deal killer <$50,000,000
0 $100,000,000
++ >$500,000,000
deal killer <$30,000,000
0 $50,000,000
++ >$100,000,000
0 Trade secrets only
+ Core patents pending
++ Patents issued
+++ Complete patent estate
-- Very strong
- Strong
0 Fragmented
+ Weak
++ Very weak
-- Very low
- Low
0 Modest
+ High
++ Very high
-- Haven't ever considered
- Many possibilities identified
0 Narrowed to one or two challenges
+ Initial challenges verified
+++ Channels established
-- Only have a plan
- Writing code/in product development
0 Product ready for customer evaluation
++ Positive, verifiable customer acceptance by beta site
+++ Customer lined up
++ $250,000 to $750,000
+ $750,000 to $1,500,000
0 $1,500,000 to $20,000,000 
In what stage is the 
business in the 
company
Funding required
Business stage
What amount of 
funding is required
What is the status of 
Intellectual Property?
What is the strength of 
competition in this 
marketplace?
How large are the 
barriers to entry?
Competitive 
Landscape
What channels of sales 
are in place?
Sales channel
What is the potential 
for revenues in 5 
years?
Size of the opportunity
Founder's experience
Is the founder willing 
to step aside if 
necessary, for a new 
CEO?
Is the founder 
coachable?
How complete is the 
management team?
Strength of 
management team
What size is the 
specific market for the 
company's 
product/service?
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Annex 3 – List of Venture Capital Firms registered at CMVM – CMVM (2018) 
 
Sociedades de Capital De Risco
Agrocapital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Alpac Capital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, S.A
Armilar Venture Partners - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Atena Equity Partners - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, S.A.
BCP Capital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Bem Comum - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Beta - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
BIZ Capital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Blue Catching - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Bluecrow - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, S.A.
BPI Private Equity - Sociedade Capital de Risco, SA
Bright Ventures Capital, SCR, S.A
Busy Angels, SCR, S.A
Caixa Capital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Capital Criativo - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Celtis Venture Partners - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Change Partners - SCR, SA
Core Capital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Crest Capital Partners - Socidade de Capital de Risco, S.A.
Critical Ventures - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
EDP Ventures- Sociedade de Capital de Risco, S.A
ERIGO - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Explorer Investments - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
FASTTRACK VC, SCR, S.A.
Fund Box - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Grande Enseada Capital Partners, Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Growth Partners Capital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Haitong Capital - SCR, S.A.
HCapital Partners, SCR, SA
Hovione Capital, Sociedade de Capital de Risco, S.A.
Iberis Semper- Sociedade de Capital de Risco, S.A
ÍNDICO CAPITAL PARTNERS - SOCIEDADE DE CAPITAL DE RISCO, S.A.
Inter Risco - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
ISQ - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Lean Company Ventures, SCR, S.A.
Lince Capital, SCR, S.A
Menlo Capital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, S.A.
Naves - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Novabase Capital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
ONETIER PARTNERS, SCR, SA
Optime Investments - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
PHYXIUS, SCR, S.A.
Portugal Capital Ventures - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Quadrantis Capital - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
Vallis Capital Partners - SCR, SA
2BPARTNER - Sociedade de Capital de Risco, SA
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Annex 4 – Number of Privat Equity Firms in Portugal – Invest Europe (2017) 
 
Annex 5 – Criteria withdrawn from Past Literature – own 
 
[2017]
# Headquarted in 
Portugal
Capital under 
management (€ million)
25 3,762
11 289
3 199
11 3,274
Total Private Equity Firms
venture capital firms
buyout firms
generalist firms
Number of private equity firms in existence: firms with at least one office in Europe, and that manage at least one direct investment 
programme/fund
Macmillan et al., 1985
The entrepreneur's personality Capable of sustained intense effort
Able to evaluate and react to risk well
Articulate in discussing venture
Attends to detail
Has personality compatible with mine
The entrepreneur's experience Thoroughly familiar with the market targeted by venture
Demonstrated leadership ability in the past
Has a track record relevant to the venture
The entrepreneur was referred to me by a trustworthy source
I am already familiar with the entrepreneu's reputation
Characteristics of the product/service The product is proprietary or can otherwise be protected
The product enjoys demonstrated market acceptance
The product has been developed to the point of a functioning prototype
The product may be described as "high tech"
Characteristics of the market The target market enjoys a significant growth rate
The venture will stimulate an existing market
The venture is in an industry with which I am familiar
There is little threat of competition during the first three years
The venture will create a new market
Financial Considerations I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within 5-10 years
I require an investment that can be easily made liquid (e.g. taken public or acquired).
I require a return equal to at least 10 times my investment within at least 5 years
I will not be expected to make subsequent investments
I will not participate in latter rounds of investment (requires my participation in initial round of 
investment)
The Venture Team The venture is initiated by one person with the relevand experience to his idea
The venture is initiated by more than one individual, each having similar relevant experience
The venture is initiated by more than one individual, the individuals constituting a functionally balanced 
management team
None of the above are essential for the venture to go forward.
Hisrich and Jankowicz, 1990
Concept
Management
Returns
Fried and Hisrich, 1994
Concept Significant potential for earnings growth
Business idea
Substantial "competitive advantage"
Reasonable overall capital requirements
Management Personal Integrity
Performance in prior jobs
Realistic ability to identify risk
Hardworking and flexible
Thorough understanding of the business
Leadership
General Management expertise
Returns Exit opportunity
Potential for high rate of return
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Professor William A. Sahlman, 1996
People Who are the founders?
What have they accomplished in the past?
What directly relevant experience do they have for the opportunity they are pursuing?
What skills do they have?
Whom do they know and who knows them?
What is their reputation?
How realistic are they?
Can they adapt as circumstances warrant?
Who else needs to be on the team? Are the founders prepared to recruit high quality
people?
How will the team respond to adversity?
Can they make the inevitable hard choices that have to be made?
What are their motivations?
How committed are they to this venture?
How can I gain objective information about each member of the team including how they
will work together?
What are the possible consequences if one or more of the team members leaves?
Opportunity Is the total market for the venture’s product or service large and/or rapidly growing?
Is the industry one that is now or can become structurally attractive?
What are the appropriate analogies? If a venture is successful, what will it look like?
Who is the customer?
How does the customer make decisions?
To what degree is the product or service a compelling purchase for the customer?
How will the product or service be priced?
How will the venture reach the identified customer segments?
How much does it cost (time and resources) to acquire a customer?
How much does it cost to produce and deliver the product or service?
How much does it cost to support a customer?
How easy is it to retain a customer?
When do you have to buy resources (supplies, people, etc.)?
When do you have to pay for them?
How long does it take to acquire a customer?
How long before the customer sends you a check?
How much capital equipment is required to support a dollar of sales?
Competition Who are the current competitors?
What resources do they control? What are their strengths and weaknesses?
How will they respond to our decision to enter the business?
How can we respond to their response?
Who else might be able to observe and exploit the same opportunity?
Are there ways to co-opt potential or actual competitors by forming alliances?
Context
First, I want to see that the entrepreneurial team is aware of the context and how it helps or hinders their 
specific proposal.
Second, and more importantly, I look for sensitivity to the fact that the context will inevitably change. If 
so, how might the changes affect the business? And, what can management do in the event the context 
worsens?
Finally, are there ways in which management can affect context in a positive way? For example, can 
management have an impact on regulation or on setting industry standards?
What new information would dramatically change your perception of the likelihood of success for a given 
venture?
Deal What are the incentive effects of the allocation?
Who will be attracted by the terms offered?
What are the logical implications if the parties to a deal behave in their own perceived best interest?
From whom should the money be raised?
How much money is needed and for what purpose?What deal terms are fair and provide the appropriate incentives for each side under a wide range of 
scenarios?
Kaplan and Strömberg, 2000
Market Analysis - size and growth
Technology 
Customer/ Adoption 
Competition
Management Team
Financial projections and Exit strategies
Luís Villalobos, 2007
Strength of Management team Founder's experience
Is the founder willing to step aside if necessary, for a new CEO?
Is the founder coachable?
How complete is the management team?
Size of the opportunity What size is the specific market for the company's product/service?
What is the potential for revenues in 5 years?
Competitive Landscape What is the status of Intellectual Property?
What is the strength of competition in this marketplace?
How large are the barriers to entry?
Sales channel What sales channels are in place?
Business stage In what business stage is the company?
Funding required Amount of funding required
Rajan, 2010
Great entrepreneurial team
Large and fast growing markets
Differentiated value proposition
Feasibility of Exit opportunities
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Rajan, 2010
Great entrepreneurial team
Large and fast growing markets
Differentiated value proposition
Feasibility of Exit opportunities
